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Research into social exclusion is exploring how 
the Internet influences citizens’ access to 
resources, and whether a digital divide (DD) 
now exists that creates social and economic 
haves and have-nots.  If so, will new information 
and communication technologies (ICT) 
exacerbate or ameliorate the problem?  Two 
New Zealand studies of information poverty 
suggest that dualistic constructs such as the DD, 
which owes its origins to studies of information 
richness versus information poverty, are not 
sufficiently robust to bear the weight of analysis 
of ICT’s effects on society.  In this paper, we 
propose that binary views of information 
impoverishment are misleading, and we describe 
how more in-depth ways of seeing the topic are 
needed to reconfigure its rhetoric.  A continuum 
of relative information deprivation is seen as 
more realistic than a binary model and we offer 
a perspective on information poverty based on 
the diverse life-worlds inherent in pluralistic 
societies.   
 
 
An increasing amount of attention is 
currently being paid to issues of exclusion and 
inclusion in society.  Over the past 30 or so 
years, communication scholars have been 
addressing in literatures such as the knowledge 
gap hypothesis (e.g., Dervin, 1980; Gaziano, 
1997; Tichenor, Donohue & Olien, 1970) the 
relative state of information rich and information 
poor individuals in society.  One aim of this 
scholarship has been to map communication-
related manifestations of systematic exclusion of 
underprivileged persons from learning, 
economic and career opportunities. 
What is information poverty?  Childers and 
Post (1975) stated that the information poor lack 
knowledge of the information channels that may 
be open to them, often view television but 
seldom read newspapers or books, do not see 
information as a means of solving their 
problems, lack the habits of active information 
seeking, and exist within deficient  information 
networks. 
Chatman (1996) builds on this by seeing the 
information poor in the context of their 
relationship to the privileged of society or 
information rich.  She describes the information 
poor as lacking in sources of support, as missing 
out on the supply of information that would 
benefit them, as practising deception as a means 
of self-protection from unsupportive or 
threatening others, and as experiencing an on-
going distrust of others. 
  Problems associated with systemic 
deprivation have recently been exacerbated by 
problems of access to and use of new 
information and communication technology 
(ICT).  There is increasing societal awareness of 
the power of the Internet and the WWW to 
shape society and influence access to resources.  
In particular, is there now a digital divide (DD) 
that excludes some groups from social and 
economic opportunities, and will new 
information and communication technologies 
(ICT) exacerbate or ameliorate the problem? 
Overseas there has been a burgeoning of 
literature on the DD, (e.g., Bolt & Crawford, 
2000; Norris, 2001; Schön, Sanyal & Mitchell, 
1999; United States Department of Commerce, 
1999; Wresch, 1996).  In New Zealand attention 
is now being paid to whether the advent of the 
PC and the Internet has created a new 
disadvantaged sub-class (e.g., 20/20 
Communications, 2002; Computers in homes 
(n.d.); Residents of Newtown (2001); Taking 
our opportunities (n.d.).  Terminology such as 
knowledge gaps, social polarisation, social 
 
 
 
disengagement, technological haves and have-
nots, and bridging the digital divide is being 
freely used in the literature.  Many of these 
terms are binary in nature, as though the 
community has created for itself a predominant 
metaphor expressing its anxieties about the 
negative impact of ICT, but very largely in 
dualistic terms.  In this paper, we indicate our 
concerns about the implications of this way of 
seeing, and offer some alternative perspectives. 
 
The two studies of information poverty to 
date 
 
The Profile of Information Poverty (PIP) 
study 
 
In the PIP study we set out to profile the 
dimensions of information poverty in extended 
interviews with 20 low socio-economic status 
persons in Auckland, New Zealand, in a test of 
Chatman’s (1996) six-proposition model.  
Briefly, Chatman’s model makes six predictions: 
that information poor people perceive they are 
devoid of sources of help perceived class 
distinction reduces their access to information, 
they engage in self-protective behaviours, they 
employ secrecy and deception as self-protecting 
mechanisms, they avoid exposing their true 
problems, and they selectively introduce new 
knowledge. 
Our research supported the Chatman findings 
that information poor people engaged in self-
protective behaviour and that they avoided 
revealing their true problems.  Others of our 
findings provided a contrary view in that the 
New Zealand respondents did not perceive 
themselves as devoid of social support; class 
distinction and privileged access to information 
were less salient; and there was little evidence 
for selective introduction of new knowledge.  
There was fairly equal evidence with respect to 
whether respondents’ behaviour featured secrecy 
and deception. 
Our overall conclusion was that information 
richness is an easier concept to define than 
information poverty.  Definitions of the former 
usually focus on characteristics of the individual 
rather than take into account the characteristics 
of community.  In contrast, information poverty 
seems more a description of an “individual in 
community” than of an individual alone, and so 
we infer that the dimensions of information 
poverty are likely to take different shapes 
depending on the community in which they 
appear. 
This study also drew attention to the 
distinction to be drawn between access to 
information and communication technology 
(ICT) and ability to make meaningful use of it.  
The manifestations of social exclusion go well 
beyond possession of technology, and even 
though quite impoverished households might 
well possess technology such as televisions, 
VCRs and even a computer, no assumptions 
could be made that mere possession of ICT 
guaranteed successful use of it for social or 
economic purposes. 
Because of this “shape-shifting” quality of 
information poverty, we considered that binary 
conceptions were inappropriate, for the reason 
that a binary division tends to be founded on one 
of two principles, either quantity or kind.  If 
quantity, then those with “more” at a certain 
point become evidently different from those 
with “less.”  This is not a useful metaphor when 
assessing our subject, for information (although 
undoubtedly a resource) is different to other 
resources.  This is because more information 
will not necessarily solve a person’s problems in 
the same way as more food will save a hungry 
person from starvation or money will pay your 
bills. 
If, on the other hand, there is a binary 
division based on kind, then there is a tendency 
to focus on differences between groups rather 
than similarities.  In turn, this lends itself to 
conceptualisation of the information poor as “the 
other,” “those who are different,” and so on, 
which is also unhelpful in describing 
information poverty for a different set of 
reasons.   
 
The New Zealand Parents as First Teachers 
(PAFT) study 
 
The second information poor study explored 
the New Zealand Parents as First Teachers 
(PAFT) programme with the purpose of 
discovering the communication and parenting 
 
 
 
outcomes that accrued from intensive, one to 
one support of information poor parents in their 
own homes by trained educators.  At the heart of 
the PAFT programme is the monthly home visit 
in which the educator spends an hour a month 
working with parents, helping them to 
understand and facilitate their children’s 
development (Williams, Sligo & Comrie, 2001). 
Findings relevant to information poverty 
from the PAFT study were that most parents 
stated a preference for self-reliance rather than a 
wish to seek support from outside their own 
immediate circle.  Despite the need to appear 
self-sufficient, most of the sample (N = 16) 
showed a need to interact with others by means 
such as interacting with parents like themselves, 
as in playgroups.  Nearly half of the sample had 
difficulties with transport to needed services. 
Perhaps through their membership of the 
PAFT programme, parents were becoming tuned 
in to the importance of information-seeking and 
positively inclined to learn about parenting 
skills, often, they said, to break learned 
dysfunctional patterns of child rearing.  The 
PAFT educators were va lued highly with parents 
noting the support in the form of affirmation and 
validation that they received from this source.  
In our assessment of the programme, we noted 
the normative pressures on young parents that 
tended to put the onus on them to find their own 
solutions to parenting difficulties, despite 
problems of social and intellectual isolation. 
In the PAFT study we saw that the parents’ 
display of the need to be seen as self-sufficient, 
combined with their isolation, made it easy for 
educational, medical and social service 
authorities to categorise them as outsiders, under 
the information poor – information rich rubric.  
We identified that a more helpful approach to 
understanding the parents’ world and assisting 
them to change it, was to build on their 
strengths.  The strengths of the parents included 
their ability to: 
 
? define their own need to change old 
patterns to which they had been 
exposed 
? help the educator to act supportively 
within the parents’ own 
circumstances 
? come to see themselves (rather 
than the visiting educational expert) as 
the change agent in control. 
 
What did we learn? 
 
Based on our two studies of information 
poverty, we propose that concepts such as the 
DD, and even information richness versus 
information poverty, are not sufficiently robust 
to analyse much further ICT’s effects on society.  
At the heart of the problem is the dualistic 
character of DD and its inherited theoretical 
base.  Binary ways of seeing information 
deprivation such as rich-poor, insiders-outsiders, 
upper class-lower class, are limiting in that they 
set up dichotomies that are likely to mislead. 
We acknowledge some tradition in the 
sociological and communication literatures of 
binary conceptions of underprivilege, such as 
Merton’s (1968) insider – outsider views.  No 
doubt such an approach lends itself well to what 
may be a general preference for forms of 
explanation that state the problem in readily 
graspable ways, and that offer possible solutions 
for practitioners to implement. 
We also note the mass media’s liking for 
catchy slogans, and their preference for 
reporting information in ways that fit standard 
preconceptions.  Media news reporting practices 
tend to reshape complex problems into 
predictable moulds for the benefit of readers 
with a small attention span.  Media news values 
also favour conflict, celebrity, scandal and 
winners versus losers, into which frame, binary 
constructs such as rich versus poor may readily 
be fitted. 
Even communication researchers may be 
attracted by dualistic conceptualisations if such a 
framing of the problem looks researchable or 
likely to attract research funders.  The problem 
of over-simplifying evokes a long-standing issue 
in scholarship dating back at least to William of 
Occam’s law of parsimony (Occam’s razor), 
which holds that the fewer assumptions an 
explanation of a phenomenon depends on, the 
better it is.  We fundamentally agree with this 
proposition and do not postulate that a more 
complex explanation is necessarily better than a 
simple one.  Rather, we think that in the case of 
 
 
 
the DD, simple has turned into simplistic.  The 
essential problem with a binary conception of a 
research problem is that it tends to be 
exclusionary and lends itself to stereotyping the 
subjects of that research, categorising them into 
what may be convenient but ultimately invalid 
and unhelpful groupings. 
The dangers of stereotyping of course 
increase when the topic under debate is 
politically contested, fraught with controversy, 
or representative of social divisions, as tends to 
be the case with the DD.  We note something of 
a history of this problem in precursor studies to 
the DD, such as information-poor individuals 
being stigmatised by researchers as “the chronic 
know-nothings” (Hyman & Sheatsley, 1947).   
Alternatives to a binary model 
 
Our two studies of information poverty 
suggest that dualistic views are misleading, and 
that different ways of seeing the topic are 
needed to reconfigure its rhetoric.  We propose 
two complementary alternatives to a binary 
model.  First, we argue that a continuum of 
relative information deprivation is more realistic 
than binary thinking, because it opens up more 
possibilities than either-or.  Second, we believe 
that although a continuum of information 
poverty is better than its simpler alternative, it is 
also limited in that it is similarly based on 
polarities, albeit in a more sophisticated way.  
Once researchers have grasped that a continuum 
is better than an either-or, we next need to move 
on from it into the second and complementary 
way of seeing information poverty, which is 
within the frame of “different worlds.” 
It may be argued, if the different worlds 
perspective is really better than a continuum, 
then why retain the latter?  In fact, we propose 
its retention because while only a partial 
explanation of a phenomenon, it probably offers 
a more straightforward approach to researching 
information poverty than the different worlds 
model.  Each approach offers its own way of 
obtaining insight into a complex reality. 
Thus, our second perspective is based on the 
assumption of different worlds and different 
world-views.  Researchers such as Chatman 
(2001) have been moving in this direction, but 
the “small worlds” to which she alludes should 
not be thought of as applying just to “the other,” 
the world of the information poor, but instead 
refer additionally to the worlds that any and all 
of us inhabit. 
 
How best to research? 
 
One difficulty in investigating the topic of 
information poverty is the question of 
appropriate epistemologies.  We rank the object 
of enquiry along a scale from metaphor to 
variable (Table 1), ranging from most to least 
complex and least to most precise.  Most social 
science and communication research has in the 
past favoured research done at the level of the 
variable as, generally speaking, this is the kind 
of research that finds publication.  Precise 
results are sought, but often simplicity and 
precision have been obtained at the expense of 
meaning and social significance.  In recent times 
a trend has started to develop across the social 
sciences featuring exploration at the more macro 
level of complexity such as metaphor, an 
approach that requires methods closer aligned to 
human intuition or insight and artistic 
endeavour.  Different ontological, 
epistemological and methodological 
assumptions operate in research at respectively 
metaphor or variable ends of the continuum.
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions of the metaphor – construct 
continuum 
 
 Is normally best 
investigated by 
empirical 
means? 
Is normally best 
investigated by intuitive or 
artistic means? 
Level of 
complexity 
Level of 
Precision 
Metaphor Probably not Probably  High  Low  
Concept Probably not Possibly Relatively 
high 
Relatively 
low 
Construct Possibly Possibly Relatively 
low 
Relatively 
high 
Variable Yes Probably not Low  High  
 
One of the challenges we have encountered in 
researching information poverty is that 
characterisations of it such as the DD are 
essentially metaphors, and so are likely to evoke 
complex rather than simple mental connotations.  
A metaphor is a way of apprehending 
something, a new means, perhaps, of seeing 
some phenomenon in a new light.  Often it is an 
aid to understanding or a way of arriving at 
some inference or new knowledge.  While it is 
true that an individual may also use a metaphor 
to help communicate an idea to someone else, 
we see its especial value as its capacity to trigger 
an insight, perhaps an “ah-ha” response in the 
human mind.  Since every person’s reaction to a 
given metaphor, (especially when thinking about 
a complex phenomenon such as information 
poverty) is likely to be unique, no two 
interpretations of a metaphor are going to be the 
same. 
In contrast, a variable is a “concept that can 
have two or more values” (Frey, Botan & Kreps, 
2000, p.442) and thus is usually (or should be) 
low in complexity and high in precision.  Its 
qualities of preciseness and therefore 
communicability in exact terms enable us to 
regard it as a means of sharing information and, 
potentially, generating understanding. 
For these kinds of reasons, research into 
information poverty that confuses metaphorical 
and variable levels of investigation and analyses 
is likely to come up with confused outcomes.  
While metaphor is a powerful means to help 
people think about an issue, for replicable 
progress it is necessary to identify research 
problems that are based on reasonably precise 
constructs. 
 
Information and inference, not knowledge 
 
Not a knowledge gap, an information gap 
 
One of the difficulties in studying so-called 
knowledge gaps is the imprecise nature of the 
English language.  Up until recent times it has 
seemed generally acceptable to use the terms 
information and knowledge as reasonably 
synonymous words.  However, with increasing 
interest in a variety of fields in the precise nature 
of knowledge and information, there currently 
appears to be a developing acceptance that the 
two words have sufficiently distinct 
connotations as to require different terminology.  
In this paper our suggested definitions of key 
terms are: Information: data that are processed 
directly via the human senses; and knowledge: a 
personal understanding or interpretation of some 
information. 
Following these definitions, the key 
distinction between data and information is that 
information is essentially a human preserve and 
may be collective, while knowledge is also the 
preserve of the human but is individual and 
cannot be collective.  If the knowledge 
possessed by an individual is unique and so in 
important ways is distinct from other people’s 
knowledge, then there cannot be a knowledge 
gap as such.  This is because the notion of a gap 
implies contrast between entities that can be 
compared on the same scale or measured by 
similar means.  Notwithstanding this point, it 
 
 
 
should also be acknowledged that knowledge is 
always derived within a particular cultural 
context, and is always understood within that 
cultural context. 
If each individual understands things in their 
own special way, though that knowledge is 
mediated via culture, then each of us lives in a 
"small world," which we partly inherit and 
partly create by both intentional and osmotic 
means.  We find it easier to defend the concept 
of information gaps (whereby people can be 
realistically categorised into information rich 
and information poor) than knowledge gaps, 
which implies the comparison of apples, 
oranges, grapefruit, pears, bananas, etc. 
This paper contends, though, that we can 
usefully understand information and knowledge 
as being on a continuum of increasing 
complexity, with information simpler and 
knowledge more complex.  This way of stating 
the differentiation between information and 
knowledge suggests that knowledge may be 
distinguished from information in two ways: by 
its characteristics of being more personal than 
collective, and more complex than simple in 
nature. 
Therefore the nature of gaps is better suited to 
information (potentially more collective than 
individual, and more simple than complex), in 
comparison to knowledge.  We do not argue, 
though, that information and knowledge should 
be seen as wholly discrete entities and there is 
probably some overlap between them.  But 
certainly in respect of knowledge of a more 
complex and personal nature, gaps seem to be an 
unhelpful means of conceptualising differences. 
 
Not a knowledge gap, an inferential gap 
 
If the concept of gaps in complex and 
personal knowledge is not especially helpful, 
then how do we characterise the differing 
abilities of people to comprehend and use the 
information they receive?  That is, even if two 
people do receive the same information, what 
they can infer from that information, and what 
use they can make of it, may differ according to 
their ability to see the utility or value of that 
information, or to build on it.   
An early study that helped to define the 
knowledge gap research programme was 
Tichenor, Donohue and Olien’s (1970) account 
of research that explored the estimates by 
respondents educated to college, high school and 
grade school levels as to when there was likely 
to be a live landing on the moon.  The 
researchers found that over a 16-year period 
college educated respondents were significantly 
better able to identify the probability that a 
moon landing would occur, in comparison to 
high school graduates, and the latter were more 
accurate than grade school persons, and this they 
characterised as a knowledge gap.  Respondents’ 
success therefore seemed to stem from a better 
command of information in the media, plus what 
they were able to derive from it. 
However, we find it difficult to see this as a 
knowledge gap as such.  The better educated 
people could not “know” the date of the first 
manned landing better than the less educated, 
because no one could give a valid statement of 
just when the moon landing would occur.  
Where the better-educated people won out was 
on their ability to infer a probability based on 
information in the media.  In this way, we 
distinguish between knowledge and inference.  
An inference refers to a capacity or willingness 
to reason or surmise based on information.  
Inference is commonly understood as a form 
reasoning based on either deduction or 
induction,  and it may overlap with noticing 
(Starbuck & Milliken, 1988), interpretation 
(Isabella, 1990) and may be close to 
sensemaking (Weick, 1995) (except that 
sensemaking seems to be retrospective, while 
inference may have more to do with the present 
or future). 
What people can reasonably infer from what 
they already know depends on what they 
understood in the first place.  Possible inferences 
from known facts could include, for example, 
what might a person learn from this data, what 
use might a person make of it, why is it 
important, what might lead from it, what does 
the participant think that the researcher is 
looking for in this situation, etc.  We also 
surmise that the ability to infer from known data 
might be similar to the ability to be 
entrepreneurial, if entrepreneurial ability is 
 
 
 
something to do with seeing possibilities that 
others may not (then acting on them). 
 
Future research 
 
The nature of how people infer from existing 
known facts is complex, but could offer some 
prospects for exploring the boundaries between 
information richness and poverty.  Research 
may even go beyond the ability to infer, and 
start to consider people’s ability to think 
creatively or entrepreneurially on the basis of 
their existing data, while at the same time 
assessing the barriers to that process inherent in 
the condition of information poverty.  If, as 
already suggested, entrepreneurial ability is 
something to do with seeing possibilities that 
others may not, then acting on them, then 
research may find its future in the study of 
creativity and innovativeness. 
We also believe it is essential to craft 
research in such a way that it builds on the 
strengths of individuals and communities.  
Diversity offers a cha llenge in its inevitable 
questioning of the assumptions of the status quo, 
but it is also an opportunity to reveal new ways 
of seeing and a richer form of community. 
Instead of the digital divide, we need to think 
in terms of “digital enablement,” but such 
enablement needs to be first on the terms of the 
users.  A command of PC functions and the 
Internet will enable different subcultures to 
foster their own priorities, to build their own 
sense of self-efficacy in computing and 
elsewhere, and in this way to break down a 
sense of separateness from society.  Once former 
non-users are confident in their new use of 
computing systems then they are much more 
likely to participate in the mainstream digital 
economy. 
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